Multi-Scalar Localization and Capability Transference: Exploring Embeddedness in the Asian Retail Expansion of Tesco by Wood, SM et al.
1 
 
Multi-Scalar Localization and Capability Transference: 
Exploring Embeddedness in the Asian Retail Expansion of Tesco 
 
 
 
Steve Wood¹, Neil M Coe°, Neil Wrigley×  
 
 
¹ The Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK.  
Email: sm.wood@surrey.ac.uk  
 
° Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, AS2, #03-01, 1 Arts Link, Kent 
Ridge, Singapore 117570  
Email: geonmc@nus.edu.sg  
 
× Geography & Environment, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK.   
Email: n.wrigley@soton.ac.uk  
 
 
Accepted draft manuscript for Regional Studies, May 2014. 
If citing please refer to the final version in the journal 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We would like to thank Matthew Truman and Paul Diamond at JP Morgan; James Anstead at 
Barclays Capital; Clive Black at Shore Capital and Dave McCarthy at Evolution Securities for 
estimates and information concerning Tesco performance.  Finally, we appreciate the helpful 
and constructive comments of anonymous referees in helping to improve this paper.  All errors 
and omissions are the responsibilities of the authors. 
 
  
2 
 
 
Multi-Scalar Localization and Capability Transference: 
Exploring Embeddedness in the Asian Retail Expansion of Tesco 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper revisits the “firm in the region” and the “region in the firm” dichotomy through the 
case of Tesco’s retail expansion in Asia.  It focuses on the tension between the transference of 
proven key capabilities to the host economies Tesco has entered, and strategic localization, 
primarily for customer-facing, corporate culture, regulatory and institutional reasons.  We 
demonstrate how the retailer has pursued a multi-scalar adaptive approach that goes beyond 
any standardized/localized dichotomy to respond to differences between and within national 
markets.  In the process, we provide evidence of genuine two-way knowledge flow between the 
home market and subsidiaries, between subsidiaries themselves, and of subsidiaries granted 
autonomy and the ability to flex their strategies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
How are subsidiary businesses regarded and treated by a seemingly all-powerful parent?  To 
what degree are they granted autonomy and the ability to flex their strategies in order to gain 
relevance and traction given the particularities of the markets which they enter and expand 
within?  Here we argue that some indication of the nature of those relationships between core 
and periphery can sometimes be seen within small details.  For example, at multinational food 
retailer, Tesco plc, the format of the email addresses of its retail subsidiaries offers, perhaps 
inadvertently, insight into the firm’s approach to international expansion.  Instead of the 
priority being assigned to the firm (@tesco.china.com), the host market is given prominence 
(@china.tesco.com).  In a small and subtle way then, this shows that the retailer places 
emphasis on the subsidiary’s operating space, forgoing a homogenous approach − something 
that feeds throughout the business and represents a considered mediation between the 
realization of central efficiency and “best practice” on the one hand, and adaptation and local 
embeddedness on the other.  As Tesco Chief Executive, Philip Clarke, has argued: 
 
We will win locally by applying our skills globally.  The key word here is ‘locally’. Seven 
years of running our business in Asia and Europe has taught me that all retailing is local 
(TESCO PLC, 2011, p 4) 
 
Such concerns have strong roots within economic geography, regional studies, international 
marketing and business studies.  The international expansion of firms is well-known to exhibit 
a tension between control and strategic planning from the centre and the local demands of the 
subsidiary operation.  Traditionally, views concerning the nature of this relationship were 
unidirectional – the head office was seen as dictating and retaining close control, with the 
knowledge generated by the subsidiary being of little relevance for the home market or other 
subsidiaries.  As SCHOENBERGER (1999) recalled, the prevailing view was one of the firm 
being in the region but of the region failing to influence the firm, its knowledge bases or its 
practices.   
 
Over the past decade, of course, this view has fundamentally changed.  Indeed, in his 
conceptualization of the geography of expanding TNCs, DICKEN (2000; 2003) drew on the 
distinction between what he termed ‘placing firms’ on the one hand –  that is to say 
understanding where firms come from, the DNA which they derive from their home market 
and the effects that this has for their approach to realising expansion and subsequent operations 
– and on the other hand, ‘firming places’ – understanding the development of the 
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organizational space of the business through intra-, inter- and extra-firm organizational 
relationships.  Likewise, AMIN and COHENDET (2004) demonstrated that the flow of 
knowledge within internationalizing firms must reflect these distinctions drawn by 
Schoenberger and Dicken.  That is to say, the two-way nature of knowledge flow – or as 
CURRAH and WRIGLEY (2004) put it, simultaneously “top-down” and “bottom-up” – is 
critical to understanding the nature and performance of TNCs.   
 
Specifically in the study of transnational retail operations, which WRIGLEY (2000) noted had 
previously lagged the general trends within economic geography, the dimension of the ‘region 
in the firm’ is of particular significance.  As has subsequently become recognized, placing the 
region in the firm and encouraging localization to achieve ‘organizational legitimacy’ of the 
business in the host economy is almost always critical to the performance of those firms 
(BIANCHI and ARNOLD, 2004).  Such concerns have been framed within economic 
geography in terms of ensuring the retailer is ‘territorially embedded’ within its host 
environment (HESS, 2004; WRIGLEY et al., 2005) or ‘strategically localized’ (COE and LEE, 
2006; 2013).   
 
In this paper we examine the approaches that Tesco has employed to achieving embedded 
expansion across its rapidly growing Asian operations.  More specifically, the research 
contributes to wider debates within regional studies and economic geography in assessing how 
pressures for standardization versus localization play out unevenly by geography and by area 
of activity.  For the transnational retailer, this strategic challenge demands continual 
(re)assessment of the interplay between centralization and decentralization.  In doing so, our 
analysis explores the need for a multi-scalar approach that looks at regional dynamics (here 
used to refer to the ‘Asian’ level); at the scale of the national market; and at sub-national 
dynamics (i.e. intra-country variations) rather than simply the global versus national market 
dichotomy usually found in literature.  In the process, we start to uncover the manner in which 
the retailer effectively responds to SCHOENBERGER’S plea for ‘the region to enter the life of 
the firm to a much greater degree’ (1999, p 222).   
 
Our focus on Asia is especially important given Tesco’s strong store, sourcing and supply 
chain presence and its performance across the continent, but also the wider region’s ‘leading 
edge’ status in terms of digital connectivity and commerce.  As Tesco Chief Executive, Philip 
Clarke put it recently, ‘our digital innovation is being driven and refined by the demands of our 
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Asian markets’, which itself demands ‘tailoring that presence to what our customers need…[a] 
powerful blend of global strength and local understanding’ (TESCO PLC, 2013). 
 
We achieve our objectives through the interrogation of an array of secondary industry data but 
also vitally through ‘close dialogue’ (CLARK, 1998) with leading UK based food retail equity 
analysts who provide detailed analysis of the company and wider market, primarily for 
institutional clients.  These insights are important for our purposes as they are informed by 
privileged access to the company above and beyond that likely to be available to any 
independent academic researcher.  Equity analyst networks are notoriously difficult to access 
(WRIGLEY et al., 2003) but have been employed with success in economic geography and 
management studies to explore global retailing (e.g. WRIGLEY and CURRAH, 2003; 
CURRAH and WRIGLEY, 2004; PALMER and QUINN, 2007).  We have built ongoing 
relationships with a number of leading analysts over a number of years and used this 
knowledge to inform our study.  Particular analysts were selected for inclusion in the research 
based on their consistent coverage of the firm over a lengthy period and their profile within the 
financial market.  We are conscious of concerns regarding the accuracy of analyst accounts and 
their closeness to management which is a benefit as well as a potential limitation (WESTPHAL 
and CLEMENT, 2008).  In addition, of course, ‘close dialogue’ such as this raises concerns 
over possible ‘seduction’ and ‘cooption’ (CLARK, 1998, p 80) — that is to say, becoming 
duped by ‘stories in the process of formation and competition for dominance’, and constructed 
to ‘deliver a particular set of accumulation outcomes’ (O’NEILL, 2001, p 194).  However, we 
have considerable experience in employing this method and use extensive triangulation to 
mitigate these potential problems.  We have used ‘within-method’ triangulation to mitigate 
these potential problems in terms of contrasting different equity analyst viewpoints over time, 
but also ‘between-method’ triangulation in accessing and analysing recordings of management 
results presentations and associated investor Q&As, reviewing the insights from national and 
local media sources, and through discussions with retail industry consultants who have first-
hand knowledge of Tesco’s expansion.  Therefore, our insights are both empirical and 
conceptual and derive from working ‘backwards and forwards between theory and the 
empirical world in a reflexive manner’ (CLARK, 2007, p 191). 
 
Our paper is structured as follows: first, we briefly reflect on the multi-disciplinary research 
within the social sciences concerning the challenges of international retail expansion.  Second, 
we introduce the economic geography of Tesco and its Asian operations.  Third, we analyse 
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how the retailer mediates between the “the firm in the region” and “the region in the firm” in 
its Asian operations across a variety of spatial scales.  We conclude with a discussion of the 
relevance of these findings for research into international business expansion within the social 
science literature more widely. 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNATIONAL RETAIL EXPANSION – ECONOMIC 
GEOGRAPHY AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES 
The international business and marketing literature explores the need for transnational 
businesses to ‘balance local responsiveness and central coordination’ (CHINI, 2004, p 37).  
While many theoretical frameworks from international business studies are inappropriately 
applied to studies of international retailing (DAWSON, 2007), the retail expansion challenge 
can be usefully expressed through the Integration–Responsiveness (IR) framework that details 
four broadly defined strategies that are related to the pressure for global integration and 
efficiency versus pressure for local responsiveness within host markets (see Figure 1).  Such a 
perspective, recently imported into retail studies (e.g. SWOBODA et al., 2012), provides 
greater nuance to the dichotomy between a highly responsive “multinational” approach and a 
replication “global” retailer strategy outlined by SALMON and TORDJMAN (1989).  Indeed, 
the mediation between the centre and the periphery is defined partly by the internal resources 
that the firm commands, but is also affected by the external resources it can access in specific 
host markets – a view that is consistent with the ‘resource bundling’ theory of transnational 
enterprise more generally (RUGMAN et al., 2011; HENNART, 2009).  Consequently, retail 
TNCs are likely to operate a portfolio of differentiated but inter-dependent subsidiaries.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
SWOBODA et al. (2012) find that food retailers have to generate a higher degree of local 
advantages and responsiveness because they experience greater pressures to adapt assortments 
to local tastes and to construct supply chains within each host country.  In contrast, they 
suggest that non-food retailers face a higher degree of global competition and lower local 
advantage as they tend to develop more standardized assortments across countries and integrate 
supply chain processes more easily.  In relating empirical survey results to the I-R framework, 
SWOBODA et al. find that the ‘International’ strategy was least successful, whereas the 
‘Transnational’ strategy proved most effective.  The model provides important insights for our 
conceptualization of managing retail expansion in its demonstration of differing degrees of 
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knowledge/capability transference and adaptation in international retail expansion.  However, 
the conceptualization has been criticized for underplaying the complexity of different aspects 
of the value chain that may exhibit different degrees of integration and responsiveness within 
individual subsidiaries (RUGMAN et al., 2011).  In addition, the framework is typically 
conceptualized in terms of home country to subsidiary country adaptation and tells us less 
about intra-country regional variation and localization – an aspect where this paper particularly 
contributes to the body of knowledge.  
  
Economic geographers have framed the challenge of international retail expansion in terms of 
attaining three related forms of embeddedness within a host market1.  This is extensively 
discussed elsewhere (e.g. WRIGLEY et al., 2005) and summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 about here  
 
Processes of adapting the retail firm to the region involve reflection on the appropriateness of 
the operator’s ‘format and formula’ for the host market (DAWSON and MUKOYAMA, 2014).  
This particularly requires close consideration of the suitability of a particular store format, 
marketing proposition, product offering, store and supply chain operations, and HR 
management, for example.  Adaptation at multiple scales can unsurprisingly take considerable 
time, and is unlikely to be complete at the point of market entry, despite many retailers 
undertaking thorough pre-entry research (cf. LOWE and WRIGLEY, 2010; WOOD and 
REYNOLDS, 2012b).  Territorially embedding the business is something that involves 
acclimatisation to (and establishment within) real-estate and land-use planning, knowledge 
networks, supply networks, and cultures of consumption (WRIGLEY et al., 2005).  Indeed, 
COE and LEE (2006; 2013) highlight the need for the continued evolution of territorial 
embeddedness encompassing format innovation, the deepening and reshaping of supply 
networks, and the expansion of the product range offered.  Similarly, JONSSON and FOSS’ 
(2011) analysis of IKEA’s reveals substantial intra-market refinement of the retail proposition 
both pre- and post- market entry.   Such longitudinal adaptive processes contrast with a view 
from international business that advocates more of a mechanical replication of a proven 
formula following a period of experimentation (WINTER and SZULANSKI, 2001). 
 
The processes of localization – and the extent to which local tailoring is necessary at all – is 
complicated depending on how unique an array of factors are to the retailer including the 
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institutional context, business customs, supplier and customer base and competition within the 
region.  Influential work conceptualizing the challenges presented by ‘particularistic’, 
‘collaborative’ and ‘arm’s length’ business environments have partly explained differing 
modes of international retail expansion (WRIGLEY and CURRAH, 2003; WRIGLEY et al., 
2005; OKEAHALAM and WOOD, 2009; WOOD and REYNOLDS, 2012b; cf. WHITLEY, 
2001).   
 
International retail expansion is a situationally dependent process that represents a complex 
interplay between importing efficient operational best practice from elsewhere in the retail 
business and adaptability for continental, national and sub-national regions – what JONSSON 
and FOSS (2011) refer to as ‘flexible replication’.  An uncritical direct transfer of managerial 
practices and competencies is often directly resisted (HURT and HURT, 2005) meaning that 
any binary conceptualization of the ‘firm in the region’ or the ‘region in the firm’ is simplistic 
and a more nuanced picture of international food retail expansion becomes evident.  What 
emerges – as the business and management literature refers to them – are practices of 
‘hybridization’ (cf. GAMBLE, 2010; LOWE and WRIGLEY, 2010) – something recognized as 
‘the creation of new management practices out of selective adaptation, innovation and change’ 
(MORGAN, 2001, p 114).  Some operational capabilities or practices may be successfully 
directly transferred, but it is more likely such replication will be partial and significantly 
amended for national or sub-national regional cultures, institutional business contexts and the 
nature of specific industry sectors (DURAND and WRIGLEY, 2009; GAMBLE, 2010). 
 
Organizationally and operationally this is challenging.  As part of expansion and adaptation 
processes, MEYER et al. (2011) identify the need for embeddedness at two levels. On the one 
hand, there is the need to embed a portfolio of subsidiary firms in numerous heterogeneous 
contexts which requires the firm to interact with a range of actors who operate in quite different 
local contexts, and then to formulate appropriate strategies without becoming overwhelmed.  
On the other hand, the retail subsidiary must interface and balance its local responses with the 
global integration and efficiencies of the wider retail parent company and its operating 
procedures (ALMEIDA and PHENE, 2004).  Or, as MEYER et al. (2011, p 236) put it, be 
‘‘externally embedded’ within each local context while also being sufficiently ‘internally 
embedded’ within the MNE network for the benefits of external embeddedness to be 
potentially available to the rest of the MNE’.  Of course this necessitates a certain degree of 
devolved decision-making at the level of the subsidiary retail operation, while also maintaining 
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an open dialogue and information flow with its parent (MUDAMBI and NAVARRA, 2004).  
Consequently, the retail TNC is widely regarded to function as a set of differentiated networks, 
rather than as a hierarchically run organization with national subsidiaries playing homogenous 
roles (cf. RUGMAN and VERBEKE, 2003). 
 
Characterizing the interface between the retail TNC headquarters and its subsidiaries as two-
way emphasizes the ability for knowledge to flow from the region, back to the core of the retail 
business to allow it to inform strategies and approaches elsewhere.  This also provides the 
opportunity for knowledge to flow between subsidiary operations (WANG, 2009) and demands 
a high degree of ‘absorptive capacity’ within the retail organization (COHEN and 
LEVINTHAL, 1990).  For truly “transnational” retailers, knowledge is likely to flow both 
ways – both from “top-down” and “bottom-up”.  Hence there is scope for learning and 
knowledge to flow back from the overseas subsidiary to other international operations and 
possibly the home market itself, albeit in a slightly amended form − in the phraseology of 
LOWE et al. (2012), a demonstration of splicing (the creation of new capabilities through 
recombination of elements of extant capabilities from multiple locations).  Such subsidiary 
influence on the transnational firm is increasingly recognized within the management literature 
(ANDERSSON and PAHLBERG, 1997; ANDERSSON et al., 2007).  These experiences see 
the retailer’s stock of knowledge increase with ‘large-scale grafting of new capabilities’ 
between locations (BIRKINSHAW and HOOD, 1998, p 781).   
 
Our analysis of Tesco’s Asian operations provides an interesting and informative case upon 
which to explore these processes that has significant relevance for economic geography and 
international business studies more widely.  While arguably an ‘extreme case’ given the 
retailer’s extensive international experience and proven expertise, its selection serves to 
elucidate the embeddedness challenges characteristic of international retail expansion.  While 
the reviewed research recognizes the tension between any global replication and localization, 
this is commonly framed in terms of retailer adaptation to variegated national institutional, 
societal and regulatory environments  ̶  our focus seeks to further develop the understanding of 
this phenomena, but also explore retailer localization within sub-national regions of subsidiary 
businesses.  Our analysis therefore aims to expose more explicitly the extent of these multi-
scalar aspects of localization and capability transference in transnational retail expansion. 
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THE EMERGENCE OF TESCO AS A TRANSNATIONAL RETAILER 
Tesco has emerged as a major international retailer in a relatively short period of time, growing 
rapidly from a domestic UK base since the early 1990s to operate a store portfolio with 
coverage across Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, in the process becoming the 7th largest 
retailer rated by international sales (Table 2).  It is now participating in markets that represent 
over half of global GDP versus only 8% in 2000 and holds the No. 1 or No. 2 market position 
in nine of its trading markets (SHORE CAPITAL, 2010a). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The international phase of development effectively commenced with the acquisition of French 
supermarket chain, Catteau in December 19922.  While this particular market entry stalled and 
ultimately led to market exit four years later due to Tesco’s apparent inability to compete in a 
market replete with large stores and a recently tightened land-use planning regime, the retailer 
learned a considerable amount from the venture – especially the need for a thorough appraisal 
of new regions and an understanding of the risks associated with entry into already developed 
retail markets (PALMER, 2004; 2005).  The retailer subsequently made a number of 
acquisitions of (or joint ventures with) food retailers across underdeveloped European retail 
markets: notably Hungary (1994), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1996), Ireland (1997) and 
Poland (2002).   
 
Crucially these small acquisitions committed minimal sunk costs yet offered Tesco footholds 
within national markets from which it could learn from a successfully embedded (and often 
domestic) retailer.  These markets (with the exception of Ireland) also offered the potential to 
roll out a hypermarket format (DAWSON et al., 2006).  As the European business was being 
developed, a similar strategic approach was adopted in Asia with market entry – commonly 
through a joint venture or modestly-sized acquisition partner − pursued across an array of 
locations including South Korea, Thailand, Japan, Malaysia, China and Taiwan (see Table 3). 
 
International expansion was framed partly as a transfer of knowledge from the home to the 
local market but with some tailoring for local preferences: 
 
Our formula is to develop a world-class hypermarket format with a common layout, 
common operations and common systems, overlaid with local marketing, local services, 
local staff and local management (Tesco PLC, 2000, p 3). 
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But also, there was awareness that expansion would involve learning and that such knowledge 
would flow back from the international subsidiaries: ‘we are developing new skills and 
experience from these businesses which we can put into practice in the UK and around the 
world’ (TESCO PLC, 1999, p 14).  These multi-directional knowledge flows occur before, 
during, and after the point of market entry – something we investigate in greater depth in terms 
of the Asian operations later in the paper. 
 
The focus of this paper is explicitly on exploring strategic growth within the Asian business of 
Tesco.  By the 2011 year-end, it was estimated that Tesco had invested a total of £6.9bn of 
capital in the continent.  During 2011/12, Tesco Asian retail sales equated to £11.2bn (see 
Table 4 for splits between Asian countries).  It is particularly notable that there remained 
substantial potential for market share growth within each of these Asian markets (cf. in the UK, 
Tesco has a circa. 30% market share).  
 
Tables 3 & 4 about here 
 
Given the challenging nature of international food retail expansion, it is unsurprising that there 
have been failures by Tesco within Asia.  Entry into Taiwan never proceeded beyond 5 
hypermarkets, having entered the country in 2000 somewhat late as the market was no longer 
underdeveloped, but instead offered considerable western competition given the presence of 
several strong retail TNCs including Carrefour, Casino (Geant) and Auchan (RT Mart).  The 
retailer eventually divested its stores through an agreement with Carrefour in 2005.  Tesco has 
also recently acknowledged defeat in Japan – a fragmented grocery market.  The retailer 
departed from its ‘hypermarket-first’ approach to market entry and failed to achieve market 
scale – a problem exacerbated with its failure to subsequently make any significantly sized 
acquisitions.  In August 2011, the retailer announced the decision to divest, and in June 2012 
confirmed an agreement with Aeon, Japan’s largest retail group, to exit the market in two 
stages.  
 
Critically, both of these failed business ventures departed from the expansion mode that had 
typified successful growth elsewhere in Tesco’s international business.  In both instances 
Tesco failed to work with a sizeable partner to provide initial critical mass, meaning that the 
retailer was unlikely to ever achieve a leading position in the market.  In addition, Japan 
12 
 
particularly was already a developed retail market – something that the Tesco had generally 
avoided between the disastrous expansion into France in 1992 and the recently acknowledged 
failed entry into the USA in 2007.  These two Asian divestments contrast with the performance 
and growth in Thailand, South Korea and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia.   
 
Tesco has approached international expansion through a staged strategy of constructing a store 
network and developing the associated support functions; building the brand by importing 
private label ranges and relationship marketing tools; and then extending that brand through 
aligned services such as mobile telephony and financial services (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Over the remainder of the paper, we explore how Tesco has addressed the multi-scalar aspects 
of localization and capability transference across its Asian operations.  We present this analysis 
through the following thematic structure for illustrative purposes – in reality, of course, most 
activities are to some degree combinations of global and more localized practices:  
 
(1) The firm in the region − establishing elements of transferable best practice in 
international retail operations, formats and principles of operation, and then: 
 
(2) The region in the firm – via (a) Strategic localization – essentially placing the region 
within the firm and overseeing considerable adaptation to realise territorial 
embeddedness within the region; (b) Intelligently transferring these practices and 
knowledge from regional operations (where appropriate) to the wider firm and its other 
international operations. 
 
THE FIRM IN THE REGION (TRANSFERING CAPABILITIES TO ASIA) 
Given the desire for economies of scale and scope, standardization is attractive as it realises the 
benefits of the wider Tesco business.  Referred to by LOWE et al. (2012, p 14) as 
‘transference’, this represents ‘the deployment of inter-dependent tasks and capabilities in 
multiple environments without local modification’.  Such capabilities particularly attuned to 
transference are often back-office rather than customer-facing aspects of retail development 
and therefore less important to localize for local, national or regional cultures of consumption.   
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Store construction, design and merchandising 
Given that the Asian market has been more receptive to the classic “big box” hypermarket 
format than some parts of Central Europe, where the Germanic discounter approach has often 
flourished, Tesco initially developed the hypermarket format across many of its Asian 
businesses.  The transference from the home market is considerable with significant leveraging 
of Tesco’s competencies in store design between countries.  These “blueprints” represent a 
systematization of both store and distribution centre design that economises on the sourcing of 
materials and in construction but also leads to subsequent operational efficiency given 
standardized space and merchandising capacities:  
 
The blueprints codify guidelines for the sales area, design standards, operating 
procedures, people plans and financial insight.  They also allow us to build for less as we 
standardise building specifications and fixtures and fittings for Group scale buying 
(TESCO PLC, 2011, p 47) 
 
However, transference extends beyond the blueprint for a store or distribution centre to 
encompass the operating model of the retailer.  This entails exporting a range of capabilities 
across the international business, such as labour scheduling, order and supply chain processes, 
and transport and planning systems.  The Tesco Operating Model evolved from the so-called 
“Tesco-in-a-Box” initiative that is a well-defined process from planning and building a store, to 
the processes underpinning its operation (ZAINO, 2009).  Its standardized applications and 
systems include the technologies that support the stores, such as the highly responsive demand-
pull lean supply chain that allows the tracking of quantities of products sold in each store and 
communicates accurate reorder estimates with partners.  As such, merchandise planning has 
seen substantial investment within Tesco’s Asian markets – for example, planograms have 
been fully implemented in the Korean business3.  This allows the retailer to be far more 
discriminating about the returns it receives in relation to the spatial allocation of product lines, 
allowing profitable timely amendments to merchandising across its store portfolio – a 
characteristic uncommon at many other international retailers.  The transferable Tesco 
operating model has understandably been described as ‘the mortar or glue that both holds the 
bricks of the business together and the oil that keeps the engine running’ (SHORE CAPITAL, 
2011, p 21).   
 
Sourcing and distribution networks  
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The transference of efficiencies are deepened through the use of global sourcing networks – 
something that is often discussed in economic geography research in relation to clothing 
(ABERNATHY et al., 2006; TOKATLI, 2008) − but is also critical in wider general 
merchandise.  Indeed, much non-food (both clothing and hard lines, such as electricals, 
homewares, toys) that is centrally sourced flows through the Tesco international sourcing 
office based in Hong Kong which was responsible, in 2009, for buying 100,000 non-food 
products for the group.  2009 also saw the start of this sourcing hub being used to support the 
Asian operations, alongside additional sourcing hubs in China, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 
and Turkey, with smaller offices in Thailand, Czech Republic and Italy (TESCO PLC, 2009).  
In addition, Tesco’s South Korean food sourcing benefits from the Shanghai Asia Commercial 
Team that was established in the Spring of 2007 (MURPHY, 2008) and in its first year of 
operation shipped 1,231 non-food and four fruit lines to Samsung-Tesco (COE and LEE, 2013).  
By benefitting from agglomeration economies with numerous suppliers situated in strategic 
sourcing locations and exploiting the efficiencies of associated shipping volumes, cost prices 
are substantially reduced. 
 
The centralization of sourcing carries with it a risk of losing sensitivity to local consumer 
demands, though these dangers can be reduced by local retail teams involved in the process.  
Importantly, when such efficient sourcing networks are established and unlocked, they 
potentially provide a sustainable source of competitive advantage given that they ‘cannot 
readily be copied by other operators’ (BOAML, 2011, p 7).  Of course, a related threat that is 
readily discussed within the research literature is the manner in which retail TNCs can be 
regarded as a highly efficient ‘trojan horse’ for imported goods that become understandably 
feared by host governments (REARDON et al., 2007) – something notably evident in 
Walmart’s entry into Mexico (DURAND, 2007).  In contrast, COE and HESS (2005) examine 
Tesco's operations in Central/Eastern Europe and identify a declining share of imports by retail 
TNCs over time as local supply capacity increases due to the upgrading of supply networks 
within the host region.  Given both the perishability and culturally sensitive characteristics of 
food, global sourcing is less viable, especially for fresh food.  This means that regional 
sourcing networks have to be established within Tesco’s international operations – an aspect 
where the retailer’s European operations were initially quicker to develop than in Asia 
(DAWSON et al., 2006).   
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Such pressures have led Tesco’s Asian operations to partially replicate the UK model of local 
suppliers delivering directly to retailer-owned regional distribution centres − a process that 
underpins highly efficient food retail logistics (GUSTAFSSON et al., 2009) − but which also 
provides a platform for further format diversification, innovation and experimentation: 
 
Once the distribution network is in place there is a kick up in cash returns through more 
effective buying, lower store operating and distribution costs (with fewer direct deliveries), 
and working capital progress – central distribution also allows for format diversity 
(SHORE CAPITAL, 2010b, p 45). 
 
As DAWSON et al. (2006, p 194) suggest, with a relatively limited store base of 20-25 
hypermarkets, ‘centralized logistics becomes economical’.  For example, in South Korea, 
Tesco opened a start-of-the-art fresh goods distribution centre in 2005 to accompany the dry 
goods distribution centre which had opened previously in 2002, while in 2008 the company 
announced a US$100 million investment in a 120,000 square metre logistics service centre in 
Ansung, Gyeonggi Province, later completed in 2010 (COE and LEE, 2013).  The centrally 
held knowledge and expertise in sourcing, logistics and supply chain allows Tesco to construct 
regional sourcing networks with established standards of food safety and ethics.  For example, 
in South Korea only 10% of products are sourced from abroad, as many of the large fast-
moving consumer good (FMCG) firms themselves have operations within the country itself.  
Over the period 1999 to 2008, the company increased its number of suppliers from 1,023 to 
3,718 with the majority of vendors among the top 20 being local companies (COE and LEE, 
2013).   
 
A similar approach to developing local in-country sourcing is evident in Tesco’s Malaysian 
operations.  NOMURA CAPITAL (2009) report some 95% of its overall product lines are 
sourced in-country with some moves to make the country an ‘export gateway’ to Tesco stores 
in the British market.  Localized sourcing makes business sense but is also astute given the 
case studies of resistance against retail TNCs that have not been so sensitive in their realisation 
of territorial and network embeddedness (cf. FRANZ, 2010; 2012). 
 
The retail brand, loyalty and culture 
Tesco’s global sourcing competencies and the scale of a growing international footprint permit 
sub-brand or private label development in non-food which can be leveraged across the Asian 
businesses.  Private label apparel, “F&F” branded ranges are increasing their penetration in the 
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sales mix, as is the tiered range architecture of “good, better, best” that has been a feature of 
the UK operation for nearly twenty years.  However, there remains substantial opportunity to 
further develop these ranges given that own-label penetration stands at 8-10% for food and a 
lot lower in non-food across many of the international operations (NOMURA CAPITAL, 
2009).  Unsurprisingly, there have been recent moves to significantly increase the prominence 
of own label ranges in the sales mix.  In the Korean Samsung-Tesco business, for example, 
own brand participation has increased to around 30% which is partly the result of greater Tesco 
involvement in product design and a major category-by-category redesign of packaging led by 
a seconded UK executive4.  These changes progressed alongside greater formalisation of 
logistical processes in the form of increased “store ready” merchandising which is helping to 
reduce the labour cost of replenishment (SHORE CAPITAL, 2010a).   
 
Complementing the own label ranges that are transferred from the wider Tesco business, the 
Asian operations also benefit from brand extensions into new product areas that have proved 
successful elsewhere.  With research suggesting that Tesco customers who use its retailing 
services spend four times as much in store than those who do not (RBS, 2009), it makes sense 
to develop additional services and capitalise on this loyal tranche of consumers.  The more 
developed Asian operations such as the South Korean business have mirrored the UK with 
entry into Telecom services through mobile phone sales and financial services since 2003.  
This approach has also been seen more widely across the Asian business, as has the approach 
to online sales fulfilment, initially via stores rather than dedicated warehouses, given that costs 
broadly move in line with revenues. 
 
The successful Clubcard loyalty scheme is increasingly leveraged across 12 of Tesco’s 
international operations, with South Korea attaining the highest Clubcard sales penetration 
throughout the global business.  While this relationship marketing tool cost £10m to initially 
develop in the UK, the cost of implementing it internationally is just £500,000 per country 
(SHORE CAPITAL, 2011).  Important in providing customer rewards for continued 
behavioural loyalty, the scheme is also significant in delivering information relating to 
customer behaviour (HUMBY et al., 2008).  Such understanding of customers is further 
reinforced by leveraging the expertise of Tesco’s 100% owned subsidiary, DunnHumby, a 
customer insight firm, that supports international operations from market entry through in-
country expansion. 
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Softer competencies such as the Tesco “Values” of “Every Little Helps” and the corporate 
steering wheel – a strategic management tool based on KAPLAN and NORTON’s (1996) 
balanced scorecard – are also extended beyond the home market.  Unsurprisingly, LOWE et al. 
(2012, p 17) argues that the transference of the Tesco Operating Model moves beyond issues of 
efficiency and cost saving and becomes central to developing the organizational culture of 
Tesco across national borders ‘by providing greater shared meaning in how and what gets 
done’.  There are consequently an array of competencies that have been transferred from the 
firm to the region – as seen most successfully in South Korea which is seen as the blueprint of 
transference (see Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
THE REGION IN THE FIRM (LOCALIZATION AT THE NATIONAL AND SUB-
NATIONAL SCALES WITHIN ASIA, AND SUBSEQUENT KNOWLEDGE 
TRANSFERS)  
In this section we assess the degree to which the region infiltrates the practices of the retail 
firm within and across Asia and how these newly learned regional capabilities may then be 
leveraged elsewhere across the international business.  This is important as strategically and 
operationally the centre ceases to be the “command and control” focus, with different forms of 
knowledge originating from (and passed between) international retail subsidiaries.  While 
centralization and standardization imperatives, particularly of back office and non-customer 
facing operational functions, are critical, it is necessary for Tesco to strategically localize to the 
environments within which it locates as ‘each market is different and it cannot simply import 
tried and tested formats elsewhere into a very distinctive arena’ (SHORE CAPITAL, 2007, p 
54). 
 
Store formats and regulatory adaptation 
Localization is seen across a range of customer-facing competencies, partly as a function of the 
different cultures of consumption within which the organization finds itself (cf. JACKSON, 
2004).  Most obviously this has been seen in retaining the Homeplus nameplate on operations 
in South Korea and the Tesco Lotus fascia in Thailand rather than running exclusively with a 
“foreign” Tesco identity.  More meaningfully, the store proposition is carefully tailored to the 
individual market, which is something important given consumer resistance to “developed” 
formats in some parts of Asia and elsewhere (e.g. GOLDMAN et al., 2002; RODRÍGUEZ et 
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al., 2002).  For example, in Thailand, where customers are used to using local wet markets 
rather than hypermarkets, there has been substantial modification to store design including 
fresh food sold in loose or small quantities so that customers can feel closer to the produce, 
given consumer hesitation to purchase fresh produce in “developed” retail formats (cf. 
HUMPHREY, 2007).  In addition, the number of shopfloor staff has been slightly increased in 
order to mimic – to some degree – the interaction customers are used to in their traditional 
daily shopping experiences.  Wholly new store formats have been developed such as the 
10,000 sq ft “Talad” format in Thailand in 2006.  The store interior is split into two spaces: the 
“store area” offers 4,500 product lines with 80% of the merchandise made up of consumer 
products and fresh foods, with the remainder clothing, hardware and a few electrical appliances; 
and a “mall area” comprising of small shops, such as bookstores, drugstores and opticians.  By 
2012, this format had expanded to 105 stores, yet its design has evolved over time, informed by 
customer feedback and knowledge relating to operations, merchandising and competition. 
 
Localization through format diversity is also important in mitigating against the effects of 
regulatory challenge.  As COE and HESS (2005, pp. 460) note, retail market entry may result 
in a ‘changing regulatory stance of the governments in those countries’, due to lobbying by 
domestic firms that have detrimental effects on new market entrants (COE and WRIGLEY, 
2007).  This may take the form of changing retail planning regulations, restrictions on further 
inward investment or tighter competition policy which requires further adaptation by the 
internationalizing retailer (MUTEBI, 2007).  Conversely, retail TNCs are likely to have 
themselves been active agents in lobbying for favourable regulations, though these interactions 
and their effects are particularly difficult to identify given their essentially secretive nature 
(SPARKS, 2008).  In these complex ways then, ‘transnational retailers are not simply 
institution takers; rather, they contribute actively to influencing institutional change in the host 
economies they enter’ (DURAND and WRIGLEY, 2009, p. 1551-2).  In Asia, between the 
economic crisis of 1997/8 and the early 2000s, large format retailers competed in fairly 
unregulated markets.  This permitted the development of strong hypermarket portfolios across 
many Asian countries, though the late 1990s and early 2000s saw a series of regulatory 
interventions in response to concerns over the effects of large format retailers on indigenous 
operators and the desirability of TNC driven retail change.  Regulations tightened across Asia, 
affecting FDI, competition and fair trade and land use zoning policies though there were 
differences between countries.  For example, in Thailand, Tesco faced an array of tightened 
regulations, notably: 
19 
 
 
• Trade Competition Act (1999) − tightened regulation against anti-competitive business 
activities and market dominance. 
 
• Foreign Business Act (effective 2000) which replaced the older Alien Business Law – 
restricted foreign participants in certain types of business (including retail) – but these 
restrictions were lifted if minimum capital requirements were met. 
 
• Zoning Laws – which were progressively tightened – initially in 1999/2000 to control 
development in Bangkok, and then in 2003 to control development in secondary ‘up 
country’ cities and towns. 
 
• Store Opening Hours regulation – effective from 2004 to limit stores over 300 sq 
metres to 11 trading hours per day. 
 
In the short term, Tesco pursued rapid pre-emptive development site acquisition in Bangkok in 
the face of prospective zoning tightening.  Over the longer term, regulatory tightening 
demanded agile adaptation from the standardized hypermarket model and a shift from the 
unidirectional transference of knowledge and competencies from the home market.  In part this 
adaptation owed a great deal to initiatives in the UK circumventing land-use planning 
regulation through the development of small format skills with the introduction of a small 
convenience format, Tesco Express (cf. WOOD et al., 2010).  While this knowledge was 
transferred to Thailand, it was then further refined within the region, and considerable 
operational knowledge flowed back to the UK home market and elsewhere.  Tesco Lotus began 
infilling the hypermarket network in Bangkok with the small Tesco Lotus Express convenience 
stores (c. 3,200 sq. ft.) at a considerable pace.  At the end of 2002, there were only 9 such 
stores.  By the end of 2004, this had growth to 47.  This trend has since continued with the 
number of smaller stores standing at 1,284 cf. 149 hypermarkets at the end of 2012/13. 
 
Localizing organizational culture 
The symbiotic relationship between the region and the firm is evident in the evolution and 
management of the organizational culture of the retail subsidiary.  As SCHOENBERGER 
(1999) testifies, units and divisions within the wider global firm develop their own identities 
and ways of thinking and working given their situational specificities and cultural 
embeddedness.  To address this potentially divisive and destabilising issue, there have been 
conscious efforts to foster a hybrid philosophy at Samsung-Tesco in South Korea, for example. 
Figure 3 presents what has been labelled a “synbaration” culture within the retail subsidiary 
that attempts to offer a fusion of the synbaram culture (‘excitement’ in Korean) (the East) with 
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an apparent rationalism of the West − something LEE (2011, p 34) suggests aims ‘to provide a 
pleasant working environment for employees to become a professional in their major areas, and 
to create a phenomenon for them to balance their work and family life’.  Consequently, there is 
a focus on a CSP culture (customer-focused, synbaram and professional) that blends the 
“Western rational processes”, such as “talent spotting” for employee development (imported 
from elsewhere in the firm) and an analytical, knowledge-based approach in store operations 
with the Eastern values of relationships, group working and team spirit, with the retailer 
operating, for example, 250 staff hobby clubs.  This cultural blend has been regarded as highly 
successful and is repeatedly referred to whenever Samsung-Tesco President Seong Han Lee 
comments on the foundations of success in the business. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Organizational structures underpinning knowledge & capability flows 
The association between the firm and the region clearly represents a dialectical relationship 
with individual country businesses operating as quasi-independent subsidiaries − something 
characterized as ‘locally focused but internationally supported’ (NOMURA CAPITAL, 2009, p 
37).  It is notable that the level of Tesco expatriate presence in-country is limited, with only 9 
executives from the UK business present in the Samsung-Tesco (South Korean) business that 
has over 23,000 employees (TESCO PLC, 2011).  However, a degree of arm’s length control is 
maintained, with each country incentivised across a broad range of hard financial targets and 
customer satisfaction metrics.  Major capital expenditure requires home market approval: for 
example, new store development is considered at a monthly meeting of the UK-based Property 
Acquisition Committee (PAC) through video-conferencing, where proposals are scrutinised by 
a selection of senior board directors who frequently visit the international businesses and gain 
knowledge of the markets.   
 
Similar top-down monitoring is executed through the Tesco International Support Office, a 
function that has emerged over the past decade, consisting of highly mobile teams of 
‘knowledge activists’ or organizational translators (cf. GERTLER, 2003) transferring best 
practice into four critical areas of retail marketing and management: Retail Skills; Commercial 
Sourcing & Capabilities; Marketing & Consumer Focus Team and the Human Resources Team.  
There is also a separate top-down co-ordination of finance and supply chain functions centred 
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around the International Finance Director and International Supply Chain Director (see Figure 
4). 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
While the influence of the firm in the region is critical to successful and efficient retail 
execution, we have recognized the flow of capabilities that have originated at (and streamed 
from) the Asian businesses.  Clearly, capturing these ‘bottom-up’ sources of knowledge is 
challenging.  Because large, dispersed, but locally embedded store networks in different parts 
of a retail TNC inevitably develop different organizational capabilities and interpretive 
frameworks, it is vital that knowledge generated from these communities of practice is 
captured, then transferred and translated within intra-firm networks (cf. CURRAH and 
WRIGLEY, 2004; WOOD and REYNOLDS, 2012a).  As both PALMER and QUINN (2005) 
and JONSSON (2008) note, it is essential that there is both a ‘degree of learning’ evident in the 
ability to adopt and adhere to the acquired learning and also a ‘locus of learning diffusion’, 
which relates to how the knowledge is coordinated and diffused within the organization.  
Similarly AMBOS et al. (2006, p 308) recognise a concern that valuable knowledge generated 
within international business subsidiaries could be ignored because it slips ‘through 
headquarters’ filters’.  There is significant evidence in Tesco of attempts to capture this local 
expertise via shared learning groups at all levels of organization, right though to the Asian 
Leaders shared learning group (including country CEOs) and to the higher level group 
involving the Chairman, Central Europe region CEO, Director of International Sourcing, CEO 
of Thailand (and Regional Asia CEO) and CEO of South Korea.  Perhaps understandably, 
these mechanisms appear to be less formalized than the processes in place for ensuring 
standardization of execution (such as the Tesco Operating Model). 
 
A key transferable competency that Tesco has leveraged in all of its host markets has been its 
industry-leading expertise in site research and property appraisal (TACCONELLI and 
WRIGLEY, 2009) – something critical in international retail expansion and the realisation of 
territorial embeddedness (WOOD and REYNOLDS, 2012b).  Initially sending expatriates, the 
retailer has quickly developed local, fully trained analyst teams – a ‘decolonization’ trend 
known to be important in successful localization (FRYXELL et al., 2004).  For example, in 
China Tesco, a 30-strong team of site researchers follow a systematic procedure for network 
planning that prioritises cities for development, identifies districts within those cities, and then 
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specific sites (see Table 6).  Tesco has been able to resource these property functions with 
executives that have a background in interpreting data-poor and particularistic markets, which 
provides significant insight compared to many other international retailers.   
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Spatially variegated format and expansion strategies  
Not only does Tesco’s Asian expansion provide evidence of partial localization for individual 
countries, it also exhibits a capability to fundamentally redesign expansion strategies according 
to specific host market circumstances and – when necessary – an ability to shape its 
management and formats for particular sub-national regional variations.  For example, in 
Thailand, Tesco Lotus has also been innovative in adopting sub-national localization to 
circumvent tightening development control in low-income ‘up-country’ towns by developing a 
low-build cost (£3 million per store) “Value” format offering 21,500 product lines.  The small-
scale (35,000 sq ft) core is surrounded by a local fresh food vendor market (leased space) and 
farming supplies/demonstration areas.  There is also a heavy emphasis on the local sourcing of 
products.  The format has expanded modestly from 11 units at the end of 2004, to 36 in 2012. 
 
A more wide-ranging departure from Tesco’s established expansion strategy came in response 
to specific host market conditions in China.  Aware that many of the strategic retail locations 
within prime, so-called Tier 1 cities have already been taken by competitors, there has been a 
conscious shift in focus to Tier 2 and 3 cities where Tesco aims to secure strategic key 
locations within growing major city catchments (TOWLE, 2010).  The strategy evolved to 
specifically focus on hypermarket development situated within shopping malls that exhibit 
high degrees of retail gravity and robust levels of customer footfall.  However, the retailer 
found that leasehold sites for such hypermarkets were often situated in poor quality malls, 
while in many Tier 2 and 3 cities suitable malls for leasehold hypermarkets did not yet exist 
(WALLER, 2010).  Therefore, while there remains a focus on developing leasehold 
hypermarkets within third party mall developments where high quality space is available, the 
retailer has found that in order to ensure that it became the prime “anchor” store, it has often 
been necessary that Tesco itself leads these overall projects to develop the freehold malls that 
are anchored by a Tesco hypermarket.  This has the potential to also generate real estate 
earnings from mall income and management fees and also to deliver returns from asset 
appreciation.  Nevertheless, such significant undertakings do not come without significant risk. 
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First, given that these developments are outside of the Tier 1 cities, consumption habits are less 
established and income per capita is lower, especially within the Tier 3 cities – more positively 
however, land prices are lower and many still have populations in excess of 1 million ‘so it’s 
not like going to frontier territory’ (BOAML, 2010, p 24).  Second, there are considerable cost 
implications of moving from becoming a “hypermarket operator” to a “major mall developer 
with hypermarket operations”.  As a retailer that has historically been lauded for its capital 
discipline, this represents a considerable challenge – something BOAML neatly summarized in 
2010: 
 
Going down the mall route may give Tesco access to the prime site in each city … but it 
comes at a high capital cost. With each mall costing c£50-60m to build… its ambition to 
open 80 malls in the next 5 years would cost £4-5bn…. Given Tesco, in total, only spends 
£1.5bn pa in international markets, it cannot afford to spend £1bn+ pa in China, alone, 
even before the logistical and administrative considerations are taken into account. 
 
To partly overcome these cost implications, Tesco established a joint venture property 
organization specifically focused on mall development that is itself regionally focused, and so 
mirrors the structure of the wider Chinese retail business (see next section).  Tesco China 
Property Company (TCPCo) is a £170m venture, funded by £30m of equity from Tesco, £30m 
from a consortium of Asian investors and debt provided by banks including Standard Chartered 
and the Commercial Bank of China (FINANCIAL TIMES, 2011).  The use of such joint 
venture partners provides scope to respond quickly to secure prime development sites and to 
build the retail and mall brand across the regions.  However, it does not simply represent a 
strategy of mitigating capital exposure on these costly projects but is itself an attempt to deepen 
the localization and embeddedness process.  Investors bring with them endorsement of the 
business plan and can provide advice and contacts in the locality both in commerce but also all-
important political officials – something known to be especially important within such a 
‘particularistic’ market (WOOD and REYNOLDS, 2012b).  The use of a property joint venture 
organization also supports cost and quality control of the development schemes, and allows the 
development of a tailored mall format that Tesco believes will be attractive in the regions and 
particularly benefit the hypermarket anchor.  The mid-market “Lifespace” mall format is a 
circa. 500k sq ft development, anchored by a circa. 100k sq ft Tesco hypermarket positioned in 
a prominent location at the heart of the mall on two levels (McLLWEE, 2010). 
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Stores developed within these malls are localized with a food range that includes reptiles and 
amphibians and attuned to local customer demands.  While there were elements of 
modernisation in that carcasses are located behind the counters rather than the aisles, butchery 
still takes place in front of the customers.  In addition, dumplings and pancakes and other local 
lines provide elements of retail theatre.  Nevertheless, the conventional Tesco model is in 
evidence with the familiar “power aisle” running through the store, meat is organized on a 
‘good, better, best’ pricing structure and sub-brands such as F&F apparel lines are a prominent 
feature (SHORE CAPITAL, 2010a).  Elements of the transferable Tesco model are also seen 
with Clubcard introduced to the Chinese market and experiencing a 70% sales participation 
which provides representative real-time data on customer behaviour, with Tesco subsidiary, 
dunnhumby involved in the analysis.  Other imported non-customer-facing capabilities include 
business appraisal processes, namely the Tesco Brand Review & Customer Plan and the 
leveraging of some central capability to manage brand, concepts and marketing plans, though 
these are executed by local marketing teams (WALLER, 2010).  
 
Sub-national regional management in China  
Tesco’s evolving strategy in China has specifically demanded a degree of sub-national regional 
sensitivity rarely required in more modestly sized host countries.  While the retailer’s entry into 
China was facilitated through a partnership with an existing operator that exhibited many 
aspects of the classic transference approach discussed earlier5, a uniform national strategy for 
the country proved inappropriate with sub-national variation in organization and execution 
required.  Particularly relevant to consider in expansion within China is the sheer scale of the 
market, with local and regional contexts that may be quite distinct from any national conditions 
(cf. MEYER et al., 2011; CHANEY and GAMBLE, 2008).   
 
Tesco found that co-ordinating its activities centrally was inappropriate – similarly many of its 
leading suppliers such as Coca Cola are themselves regionally managed.  As 
HUTZSCHENREUTER et al. (2011) discuss in the context of MNC expansion, some of the 
resource constraints that the firm can experience are managerial.  Tesco has addressed this 
concern by focusing management and concentrating store development focus on specific sub-
national regions.  The degree of in-country localization was made clear recently: 
 
Even within a single region temperatures, tastes and preferred brands can all vary, so our 
operation is ‘local’ in many ways. For example, our buying teams are based in different 
regions and even in specific provinces and cities to be close to our customers and suppliers. 
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We have appointed more local Directors this year to strengthen our China Board and have 
ongoing plans to recruit and develop local talent (Tesco Annual Report, 2012) 
 
Of course, such intra-country variation in the product offer is taken for granted in home market 
settings, where local or regional merchandise is typically offered (RICKETTS HEIN et al., 
2006).  This sensitivity to regional differences within a host country emphasizes the desire to 
achieve true multi-scalar embeddedness.  Departing from what was previously described as ‘a 
scatter gun approach’ to development (BOAML, 2010, p 23), Tesco China moved to focus on 
three regions (the North, around Beijing; East, around Shanghai; South, around Guangzhou) 
with three fully accountable regional managing directors (see Table 7).  In each of these 
regions, the retailer has established a management structure (complete with buying teams) and 
built three regional food distribution centres to consolidate supply and logistics ‘to improve the 
speed to store, store goods-receipt labour efficiency and product freshness (reduced shrink and 
better quality impression)’ (BOAML, 2010, p 23). 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
The reasons for a focus on these three particular sub-national regions are clear: first, they are 
relatively populous (750m) and affluent, with GDP per capita of 2-3 times the national average.  
Indeed, Tesco suggest that the coastal region in Eastern China constitutes about 15% of its 
territory, yet contributes 60% of the country’s economy (CHINA CHAIN STORE & 
FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION, 2011).  Second, the top five food retailers currently account for 
just £20bn sales in these regions, which offer significant potential to capitalise on income 
growth and the transition to “modern” forms of food retailing (BOAML, 2010).  While the 
initial expansion plans of Tesco in China have recently been scaled back following a business 
review6, the case underlines the requirement for a sub-national regional focus to respond to a 
constantly evolving balance between the firm’s transferable competencies and the localization 
demanded across its uneven geography.  This is summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the Asian expansion of UK food retailer, Tesco, in order to explore 
the multi-scalar aspects of capability transference and localization that have relevance for 
debates within economic geography and international business and marketing management.  
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By utilising privileged access to a knowledge network of equity analysts who conduct ongoing 
longitudinal analysis of the retailer and wider sector, we have explored how Tesco balances the 
localization demands of subsidiaries embedded within their own national and sub-national 
regional contexts, with the efficient and proven transference of capabilities from the centre.   
 
We have examined how the retailer is able to formulate (but not insist on the application of) a 
range of “off the shelf” transferable competencies and capabilities such as “blueprint” 
principles, the Tesco Operating Model (“Tesco in a Box”), distribution centre and supply chain 
approaches, tiered sub-brand/private labels, aligned financial services and relationship 
marketing tools (Clubcard loyalty scheme) that can be leveraged, at least to some degree, 
within most institutional contexts, given their limited sensitivity to different customer cultures 
and their back office efficiency generation.  In the process, we have demonstrated how the 
degree of knowledge transfer successfully applied from the centre to the subsidiary is, in part, 
governed by the conditions inherent within the host market (e.g. competition, consumer 
cultures, regulatory frameworks, sophistication of supply networks).   
 
While the research literature acknowledges that a binary distinction between the two forces of 
localization and centralization could result in inertia and inefficiency (in the event of wholesale 
devolvement to local decision making) or an insensitivity to local circumstances (in the case of 
tight, centralized control) (FIGUEIREDO, 2011), our paper has provided evidence of the 
importance of ‘hybridization’ in action.  In numerous instances, the transfer of the “Tesco 
model” was partial within national subsidiaries and there was subsequent localization of store 
formats, product ranges, services and organizational culture.  In some markets, wholly new 
strategies were required and significantly departed from the accepted Tesco approach, due to a 
wide variety of cultural, institutional or regulatory driving factors.  Such localization offers the 
potential for learning and subsequent knowledge flow from the subsidiary to the centre as well 
as the more accepted route from the centre to the subsidiary.  Such conditions were especially 
evident in Tesco’s South Korean and Thai businesses, which have taken expertise from the 
established Tesco international operating model, amended those strategies in the host market, 
and channelled some of that expertise back to influence operations in the core UK and wider 
international business.   
 
But moreover, the paper has provided evidence that the hybridization process not only varies 
between national subsidiaries, but also that there may be sub-national regional variation in 
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terms of the mediation between transference and strategic localization.  Such multi-scalar 
adaptation has most clearly been seen in the early development of Tesco’s operations within 
China, where sub-national regional organizational structures are required to manage sourcing, 
supply chain and store operations given the substantial differences in climate, income and 
culture within a single country.  Importantly, such a locally sensitive approach does not 
necessarily represent excessive localization, as the subsidiary continues to benefit in large part 
from the operating model of the wider retail organization.  Instead, it represents efforts to apply 
appropriate strategies and capabilities where they are perceived as necessary.  Of course, this 
careful approach by no means guarantees success.  Continued adaptation is likely to be 
necessary as expansion into developing retail environments continues to exhibit high risk 
opportunities; yet responding to the nuances of national and sub-national regions surely 
increases the likelihood of realizing appropriately territorially embedded retail operations. 
 
 
                                                          
ENDNOTES 
 
1
 The use of the term embeddedness within economic geography is not without its critics. Andrew JONES (2008) 
recently argued that the expression’s usefulness is limited due to its under-emphasis of the relational nature of 
power and agency, resulting in a limited conceptualization of the spatial development of economic activity. 
 
2
  Tesco had previously acquired a food retail business in Ireland (The Three Guys chain) in 1979. 
 
3
 ‘The planogram is a blueprint of the store display case and considers shelf management and presentation of each 
product.   Specifically, the planogram design takes into account shelf space allocation and location of each product 
to maximize store sales and profits’ (CHUNG et al., 2007, p 585). 
 
4
 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for clarifying these issues. 
 
5
 In common with its accepted expansion mode, in 2004 Tesco entered China through a partnership with Ting 
Hsin owned local operator, Hymall, acquiring 50% of 25 hypermarkets for £148m, followed with the purchase of 
a further 40% for £181m in December 2006.  In some respects the approach to expansion has been along the lines 
of the established Tesco approach within Asia.  The retailer acquired a share in a small hypermarket retailer and 
then increased that stake, having learned a great deal about the market.  Elements of the Operating Model were 
introduced and, in March 2007, a new fresh food distribution centre was opened in Shanghai to supply 30 stores in 
Shanghai, Jiangsu province and Zhejiang province.  Operationally this was important to gain control of the 
distribution network and therefore ensure food quality.  Having traded initially as “Happy Shopper” through the 
Hymall joint venture, a period when those original stores were refitted, there was a focus on mediating between 
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the tendencies of transference and localization in store design, a greater focus afforded to the Tesco fascia and the 
gradual introduction of the pillar Tesco sub-brands across the product offer. 
 
6
 In 2010, development plans for the Chinese business were ambitious with 600 ‘ideal’ locations identified across 
90 cities and expectations by 2014/15 of 50 malls trading (each with a hypermarket); 30 malls in development and 
over 150 leasehold hypermarkets (WALLER, 2010).  Despite these ambitious plans, Tesco’s strategy for China 
has been significantly scaled back since the writing of this paper.  By 2013, the retailer’s Chinese business was 
estimated to be losing in the region of £50m per annum (SHORE CAPITAL, 2013) and analysts widely doubted 
its continued viability.  In August 2013, the retailer unsurprisingly signalled a new ‘capital light’ strategy for 
China, consisting of a joint venture with China Resources Enterprise (CRE), a state controlled retailer, ranked 2nd 
largest in China with coverage in 24 of its 34 provinces.  Tesco argued this offered a route to growth that 
prevented it from over-extending its capital commitments, with a 20/80 ownership split in favour of CRE.  In 
addition, the joint venture would create a market leading grocery retailer with sales in excess of current market 
leader, RT Mart/Auchan. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Table 1. Embeddedness in Retail TNC Expansion  
Territorial 
embeddedness 
How the retail TNC is anchored in different places. Requires the 
acceptance across markets and cultures of consumption, planning and 
property systems, and logistical and supply chain operations. 
Societal 
embeddedness 
Underlines how the cultural, institutional and historical origins of the retail 
TNC affect how it operates in new markets. This may relate to supplier 
relations, labour-management relations etc. 
Network 
embeddedness 
Refers to the composition and structure of network relations of the retail 
TNC within and beyond the firm – e.g. with (joint venture) partners, 
suppliers, competitors, special interest groups and customers  
Sources: HESS (2004); WRIGLEY et al. (2005); WOOD and REYNOLDS (2012b) 
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Figure 1. The Integration-Responsiveness Framework 
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Global 
achieves cost efficiency by globally 
implementing economies of scale by 
standardising offerings and geographically 
concentrating their most important activities, 
assets, resources and responsibilities. 
Information & benefits flow mainly from the 
headquarters to foreign subsidiaries. Their 
most important task is to implement the 
strategy dictated by the headquarters. 
 
 
Transnational 
aims to adapt to their host countries and 
achieve efficiency at the same time. These 
firms’ resources, responsibilities and 
knowledge are allocated across all foreign 
subsidiaries on a specialized basis through 
reciprocal interdependencies between the 
headquarters and the subsidiaries. 
Knowledge can evolve in several countries 
and be transmitted to other countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
International 
(home market oriented) adapts little to their 
host countries and do not integrate their 
foreign units, which resemble an extended 
branch of the parent companies. International 
firms use the skills and knowledge generated 
in their home markets by the worldwide 
diffusion of offerings. Foreign operations are 
conducted as a safeguard for the home 
market, and the foreign units are also highly 
dependent on the home market. 
 
Multinational 
characterized by their sensitivity to host 
country administrations and local customer 
needs, by the differentiation of their goods 
and services, by their autonomous 
subsidiaries and by their geographically 
scattered activities. Goods and services are 
adapted to meet local needs adequately. 
Foreign subsidiaries are relatively 
independent of one another and of the 
headquarters. 
  Low High 
  Pressures for local responsiveness 
 
Source: adapted from SWOBODA et al. (2012) drawing on BARTLETT and GHOSHAL (1989); 
PRAHALAD and DOZ (1987) 
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Table 2. Leading Transnational Retailers, Ranked by Sales Outside Home Market, 2010. 
Rank Name of company Country of 
origin 
International 
sales 
(US$m) 
No. of countries o
f operation  
(2010) 
International sales 
(% of total,  
1999) 
International sales 
(% of total,  
2010) 
International sales 
(Change in %,  
1999-2010) 
1 Walmart US 109,539 16 14 26 +12 
2 Carrefour France 79,248 23 38 59 +19 
3 Metro Germany 55,112 34 40 61 +21 
4 Lidl & Schwarz Germany 40,132 26 20 52 +32 
5 Auchan France 38,064 12 19 59 +40 
6 Aldi Germany 33,576 18 33 53 +30 
7 Tesco UK 31,085 14 10 32 +22 
8 IKEA Sweden 29,097 38 92 94 +2 
9 Ahold Netherlands 25,605 10 76 65 -9 
10 Rewe Germany 24,303 13 20 34 +14 
11 Delhaize Belgium 21,721 6 83 78 -5 
12 Costco US 19,581 9 19 25 +6 
13 Seven & I Japan 17,803 18 30 31 +1 
14 H&M Sweden 16,430 36 84 94 +10 
15 Amazon US 15,497 7 22 45 +23 
 
Source: derived from IGD’s Retail Analysis (igd.com), Deloitte/Stores 2011 Global Powers of Retailing and Annual Reports. Revenue figures for the financial year that corresponds most 
closely to calendar year 2010. Exchange rates used are for 31st December 2010 and are taken from www.xe.com. Key rates: $1=£0.64=€0.75. 
Note: Safeway and Sears discounted from list as sales operations confined to North America only. 
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Table 3. Tesco Asia Acquisitions 
Country  Date Company acquired Price  
(£m) 
Mix of consideration No. stores Sales on  
acquisition (£m) 
Notes 
China 
  
Jul-04 50% of Hymall 148   25HMs 330 PAT of £5.5m 
Dec-06 Further 40% 181 180 cash, 1 asoc costs       
Malaysia 
  
Nov-01 70:30 JV with Sime Darby 0 na na na   
Dec-06 Makro from SHV 73 72 cash, 1 of associated costs 8   c800,000 sq ft space 
South Korea 
  
  
  
  
  
  
May-99 51% of Samsung Tesco 85         
Jun-99 Further 30% of Samsung Tesco 57         
Feb-02 Further 8% of Samsung Tesco           
Jul-07 Further 5% of Samsung Tesco 40-60         
Jul-11 Further 5% of Samsung Tesco           
Mar-05 Store acquisition from Aram Mart 49 49 cash  3 CHMs, 9 SMs £111m in 05/06 c200,000 sq ft space 
Apr-08 Homever stores from E-Land 958   36 HMs c£800m 3m sq ft of retail space, c1.3m of 
mall space. 21 freeholds. 50% paid 
on acquisition and 50% after sales 
uplifts achieved 
Thailand May-98 Lotus 206 117 cash : 89m assumed debt 13 HM c£276m   
  
  ASIA TOTAL 1,757         
Divested Markets 
Japan 
  
Jul-03 C Two Network (convenience 
stores) 
176 Cash 78 286 In August 2011, Tesco announced 
its intention to sell its Japanese 
business via a phased divestment 
process with Aeon. 
 Apr-04 Frec 16 assumed debt 27 146 
Taiwan Oct-00 Acquired 1 former Makro store at 
Tai Mall (Taoyuan)  
n.d. Cash 1 n.d. In 2005 – Tesco divested the 6 
stores and 2 sites in asset swap 
with Carrefour and receive 11 
stores in Czech Republic and 4 
outlets in Slovakia 
 
SM – supermarket; HM – hypermarket 
Source: Barclays Capital and JP Morgan personal communication with modifications 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Tesco Asia: Country Summaries, 2011/12 
 
Country Population 
(m) 
Grocery 
Spend 
($ bn) 
Year 
entered 
Sales 
2011/12 
(£m) 
Tesco 
Market 
Share 
(2012) 
Invested Capital 
2010/11 
(£m Cumulative Est.) 
Trading EBITDA 
Return (Est.) 
(2011) 
Total Space 
(000 sq ft) 
(2011/12) 
Store numbers 
(Hypermarkets/Other 
Stores)  
(2011/12) 
Clubcard Online 
Offer 
China 1,341.41 971 2004 1,311 2.9% 801 3.9% 9,622 110/14 Yes Yes 
Japan 127.47 497 2003 436 0.1% 463 0.6% 505 0/140 No No 
Malaysia 28.23 31 2002 891 10.2% 635 7.7% 3,778 45/0 Yes Yes 
South 
Korea 
48.91 96 1999 5,339 5.7% 3,600 13.7% 12,551 127/286 (+45 
franchised) 
Yes Yes 
Thailand 67.65 56 1998 3,235 13.0% 1,375 19.6% 12,831 136/956 Yes Yes 
Source: BOAML (2010); BARCLAYS CAPITAL (2012a); JP MORGAN CAZENOVE (2011); SHORE CAPITAL (2010a; 2010b); TESCO ANALYST PACKS 
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Table 5. The Tesco Approach to International Retail Expansion 
 
Build the Network 
 
Build the Brand 
 
Extend the Brand 
 
• Construct scalable store network 
• Develop store support operations 
such as distribution centres and 
sourcing networks 
  
• Evolve a collection of stores into 
a retail brand 
• Begin to introduce pillar brands 
in food and product brands in 
general merchandise 
• Introduce Clubcard 
• Create new platforms for brand 
development: internet, financial 
services etc. 
Source: adapted from information in Tesco analyst presentations 
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Figure 2. Elements of the Tesco Homeplus (South Korea) “Blueprint” of Capabilities Appropriate 
For Transference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from McLLWEE, 2010 
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Figure 3. Synbaration Culture at Samsung-Tesco: “The best of the West with the best of the East” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LEE, 2010 
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Figure 4. The Structure of Tesco International Support Operations in the early 2000s 
 
Source: WRIGLEY, 2005  
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Table 6. Tesco China Site Research Approach to Analysing Development Opportunities 
 
Step 1: Ranking of target cities 
• City Quality Matrix (CQM) ranking developed, based on economic and modern retail indicators, 
all extensively mapped and then scored 
• Key competition measures (e.g. population per mall) 
Step 2: Identifying the right districts within cities 
• Government meetings to understand future development plans 
• Team driving every road, visiting every competitor 
Step 3: Identifying best locations within district 
• Analysis of catchment spending power (hypermarket + mall) 
• Analysis of competition 
• Understanding micro-location factors (roads, access, public transport) 
 
Source: adapted from information in Tesco analyst presentations 
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Table 7. Regional Focus at Tesco China and Strategic Priorities 
 
Region Provinces Size 
(km sq) 
Population Average 
age 
% migrant % Employed in 
State Owned 
Enterprises 
Strategic Priorities & Approach 
North Region Hebei; 
Beijing; 
Tianjin; 
Liaoning; 
Shandong 
522k 236m 
 (includes 34 
of the top 
100 cities) 
41 17 27 Focus on Fresh Food 
Further improving the local part of 
the offer, particularly on the Deli 
Being No. 1 in every city 
Developing the structure and 
capability of the team 
Opening Blueprint Distribution 
Centre 
East Region Anhui; 
Jiangsu; 
Shanghai; 
Zhejiang 
361k 208m  
(includes 14 
of 20 most 
affluent 
cities) 
38 34 15 Market leading growth, building on 
existing strong positions. 
Leveraging the supply chain and 
Operating Model. 
South Region Guangdong; 
Fujian 
304k 131m  
(includes 22 
of the top 
100 cities) 
32 62 10 Increasing new store programme 
including LifeSpaceMalls 
Building on strong growth 
Earning trust in the Tesco brand 
Ensuring quality of Fresh Food in 
every store 
Developing the supply chain 
Building the capability of the team 
Source: adapted from information in Tesco analyst presentations 
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Table 8. Emerging Central and Regional Structure at Tesco China 
 
In the Centre In the Regions 
Policies, Systems, Processes, Service Centres, 
Leveraging Scale, First Among Equals 
Tailoring our offer for local customers  
As much as can be the same: As different as it needs to be:  
Financial control and reporting Commercial: local suppliers and regional 
divisions of FMCGs 
Commercial: Hardlines, Electronics, Clothing and 
national FMCGs 
Marketing: local Trade Plan 
Marketing: Insight, Membercard, Trade Planning and 
Customer Communications 
Operating stores to deliver a consistent Shopping 
Trip 
Development/deployment of Operating Model Finding and developing the people to enable 
growth 
Ordering, IT, Distribution and Supply Chain   
Property Services and Management  
Leasehold Mall Management   
Human Resources   
 
Source: adapted from information in Tesco analyst presentations 
 
 
 
 
 
